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Legislature's intent that a driver need 
not be told o fall possible consequences 
between refusing and failing a chemi-
cal test for alcohol. In addition, by 
fmding that the word "sanctions" does 
not encompass mere possibilities, the 
court has refused to recognize addi-
tional procedural safeguards for per-
sons who decline to take chemical al-
cohol concentration tests. By deciding 
that an officer is not required to advise 
a driver of potential eligibility for 
modification of suspension or restric-
tive license if a driver takes the chemi-
cal alcohol test, the court has implied 
that a person who refuses to take the 
test must be prepared to face the conse-
quences. 
- Ellen Marth 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul: CITY OR-
DINANCE BANNING CROSS 
BURNINGS AND OTHER SYM-
BOLS OF HATE SPEECH VIO-
LA TES THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT. 
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. 
Ct. 2538 (1992), the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that a city ordi-
nance banning cross burnings and other 
hate crimes violated the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution 
because it discriminated on the basis of 
speech content and was not reasonably 
necessary to achieve the compelling 
interest of protecting groups that have 
historically been the victims of dis-
crimination. While the Court unani-
mously agreed that the law was fa-
cially invalid, it was divided over the 
proper analysis of the ordinance under 
the First Amendment. The Court's 
decision resulted in a clash of interpre-
tations, with a four member concur-
rence charging the majority with aban-
doning long established First Amend-
ment principles. 
In 1990, the petitioner, a white teen-
ager, burned a cross on the front lawn 
of a black family that had recently 
moved into the city ofSt. Paul, Minne-
sota. The petitioner was charged with 
violating a local hate crime law that 
prohibited the display of a symbol 
which aroused anger, alann, or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender. The 
ordinance specifically cited cross burn-
ing and swastika displays as acts pun-
ishable under its mandate. 
The trial court dismissed the charges 
on the grounds that the law was sub-
stantially overbroad and impermissi-
bly content-based. The Supreme Court 
of Minnesota rejected the overbreadth 
claim and upheld the ordinance be-
cause the statute limited its reach to 
"fighting words" and was narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. The petitioner chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the stat-
ute, arguing that it infringed upon his 
First Amendment right to free speech. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to consider whether the ordinance dis-
criminated impermissibly on the basis 
of content, and, if so, whether such 
discrimination was reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the state's compelling 
interest in protecting those who have 
historically been the targets of dis-
crimination. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
began his analysis by acknowledging 
that limited categories of speech - such 
as obscenity, defamation and fighting 
words - had been proscribed on the 
basis of content because their low so-
cial value was outweighed by a higher 
social interest. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 
2543 (citing Chap/inskyv. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942». In 
this case, however, the majority re-
jected the view that "fighting words," 
defined as insults which are likely to 
provoke the listener to react violently, 
were entirely without constitutional 
protection. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. 
The Court determined that the govern-
ment could proscribe "fighting words" 
in general because of the activity they 
provoked, but it could not proscribe 
specific sub-categories of fighting 
words because of the ideas they ex-
pressed orthe classes they targeted. Id. 
at 2544. Thus, the majority found that 
the St. Paul ordinance was content 
discriminatory because it imposed spe-
cial prohibitions on those who ex-
pressed views on the disfavored sub-
jects of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender, while at the same time permit-
ting equally abusive messages which 
did not address those topics. R.A. V., 
112 S. Ct. at 2547. In addition, the 
Court reasoned that because there were 
content-neutral alternatives available, 
such as prosecuting the conduct under 
an arson statute, the city's compelling 
interest in protecting minority groups 
from victimization did not justify the 
law's discrimination. Id at 2550. 
The Court next outlined the two 
exceptions to content-based discrimi-
nation. The flI'st exception occurs when 
the purpose of the distinction is con-
tent-neutral. Id. at 2545. A$ an illus-
tration, the Court noted that a state 
could prohibit obscenity generally, but 
it could not prohibit obscenity that 
only included offensive political mes-
sages.ld at2546. Similarly, the Court 
noted that burning a flag in violation of 
an arson statute was punishable, but it 
had been held content-discriminatory 
to punish flag burning in violation of a 
law against dishonoring the flag. Id. at 
2544 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989». "Fighting 
words," according to the Court, were 
unprotected because ''their content 
embodie[d] an intolerable mode of 
expression." R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 
2549. Justice Scalia's analysis sug-
gested that cross burning was not "es-
pecially offensive" as it did not com-
municate ideas in a ''threatening (as 
opposed to a merely obnoxious) man-
ner." Id. 
The Court then addressed the sec-
ond exception which would permit 
content-based discrimination: where 
the regulation was aimed at the sec-
ondary effects of the speech without 
reference to the content of the speech. 
Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters 
Inc.,475U.S.41,48 (1986». TheCity 
ofSt. Paul cited this second exception 
as the basis forthe discrimination in its 
ordinance, arguing that the St. Paul 
ordinance was not intended to stifle 
freedom of expression, but rather was 
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to protect against the victimization of 
people who were particularly wlner-
able to discrimination. R.A. v., 112S. 
Ct. at 2549. The Court, reasoning that 
the "emotive impact of speech on its 
audience is not a secondary effect, 
found that the St. Paul ordinance was 
not directed to secondary effects be-
cause it handicapped "specific catego-
ries" of speech. [d. (quotiug Boos \I. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988». 
In a concurring opinion, Justice 
White argued that the case should have 
been decided by finding the ordinance 
fatally overbroad. [d. at 2550. As 
written, the ordinance could prevent 
modes of expression that had offensive 
content but were not themselves threat-
ening or harmful. For this reason, 
Justice White charged the majority with 
renouncing the traditional use of strict 
scrutiny review as atool ofFirstAmend-
ment analysis. Under a strict scrutiny 
analysis, restrictions on speech are jus-
tified where the statute is narrowly 
tailored and necessary for the achieve-
ment of a compelling interest. The St. 
Paul ordinance, according to Justice 
White, could have survived a strict 
scrutiny review if it was more nar-
rowly drafted. He faulted the majority 
for effecting an underinclusive stan-
dard which suggested that the statute 
should have banned a wider category 
of speech than was necessary to achieve 
the city's interest. This perceived de-
parture from strict scrutiny analysis 
was criticized in light of the recent 
Supreme Court decision Burson \I. 
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), in 
which the participating members of 
the present Court agreed that a strict 
scrutiny standard is applicable to a 
case involving a First Amendmentchal-
lenge to acontent-based statute. R.A. V. , 
112 S. Ct. at 2551. 
The concurrence also argued that 
the majority violated Court precedent 
by not categorically including fighting 
words among constitutionally prohib-
ited speech. [d. at 2552-53. Justice 
White recognized that fighting words 
made up no "essential part of any expo-
sition of ideas" and were wholly un-
protected by the FirSt Amendment be-
cause they were "directed at individu-
als to provoke violence or to inflict 
injury." [d. at 2553 (quoting 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
In a separate concurring opinion, 
Justice Stevens noted his frustration 
with the majority's attitude towards 
the dangers of hate speech. R.A. V., 112 
S. Ct. at 2570. In a footnote referring 
to the Los Angeles riots, he wrote, 
"one need look no further than the 
recent social unrest in the nation's cit-
ies to see that race-based threats may 
cause more harm to society ... than 
other threats." [d. at 2570 n.9. 
The Supreme Court's ruling that 
banning cross burnings and swastika 
displays on the basis of content vio-
lates the First Amendment is signifi-
cant because most states have enacted 
some form of hate speech legislation 
that will be invalidated by this deci-
sion. R.A. V. \I. St. Paul will probably 
stand as one of the most far-reaching 
interpretations of the First Amend-
ment. Although the bottom line was 
balanced, the analysis was insensitive. 
The majority's seeming perception of 
hate speech as no more than a societal 
nuisance is offensive to the many 
Americans whose lives were threat-
ened by the very actions which the 
majority characterizes as merely "ob-
noxious." To many, the sight of a 
burning cross on the front lawn or a 
swastika display on the temple wall 
exceeds mere speech and proposes a 
direct threat of physical violence. 
Moreover, the Court's fractured con-
sensus on First Amendment analysis, 
as applied to hate speech, will likely 
leave many lawyers bewildered over 
how to litigate hate crimes, and will 
leave many legislators perplexed about 
how to formulate a hate crime statute. 
- Kim Germaine Judd 
Lucas\l. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil: LANDOWNER COMPENSA-
TIONREQUIRED WIIEREPROP-
ERTY REGULATIONS DEPRIVE 
ALLECONONUCALLYBENEn-
CIAL USE OF LAND UNLESS 
REGULATIONS ARE INHERENT 
IN TITLE. 
The United States Supreme Court's 
most recent inverse condemnation de-
cision,Lucas \I. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), intro-
duced a new approach to determine 
whether a property owner has suffered 
a regulatory taking requiring the pay-
ment of just compensation. The Court 
developed a test which inquires into 
the underlying principles ofthe state's 
property and nuisance law. The new 
test considers whether the challenged 
regulations merely make explicit re-
strictions on the property's use that 
were inherent in the title to the property 
itself. If so, then no compensation is 
required under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, even if the regulation 
deprives the owner of all economically 
beneficial use of the land. 
In 1986, David Lucas purchased 
two residential lots on the Isle ofpalms, 
a barrier island located east of Charles-
ton, South Carolina. Just as neighbor-
ing landowners had done on their land, 
Lucas intended to build single-family 
homes on his $975,000 parcels. His 
plans, however, were thwarted by the 
South Carolina Legislature in 1988 
with the passage of the Beachfront 
Management Act. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 
48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 
1991) (''the Act"). The Act established 
a baseline connecting the furthest-in-
land points of erosion during the last 
forty years and prohibited the con-
struction of "occupiable improve-
ments" seaward of the baseline. Be-
cause the baseline fell inland ofLucas' s 
lots and his proposed homes consti-
tuted "occupiable improvements." 
Lucas was prohibited from building on 
his land. 
Lucas challenged the Act in the 
South Carolina Court of Common 
Pleas, arguing that the law's effect on 
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